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SUBJECTwE Rodgers:
PAIN TESTImONY
IN DISABILIY DETERMINATION
Subjective Pain Testimony in Disability Determination Proceedings
PROCEEDINGS: CAN PAIN ALONE BE DISABLING?
INTRODUCTION

Everyone has suffered pain. 1 Yet, not everyone appears to suffer the same
degree or severity of pain.' What one person considers unbearable, another

may find tolerable This occurs because each person has an individual pain
threshold. As a result, pain cannot be objectively measured; it is purely
subjective in nature. 4
Because pain affects everyone, it is not surprising that physicians consider
it to be the complaint they hear most often. Disability insurers, both private
and public, view it as an enormous problem.5 One public insurer, the Social

Security Administration (Administration), currently finds its disability
insurance program in a state of flux 6 over its attempt to answer the following
question: "Because the experience of pain is different for each person, how
is it possible to assess pain and determine a severity beyond which one

1. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, PAIN AND DISABI=TY 2 (1987) [hereinafter INST. OF MED.].
2. COMMISSION ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HuMAN
SERVICES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN 54 (1986) [hereinafter

REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN] ("The Commission wishes to emphasize the fact that no
one can know the pain of another person."). See also Report of the Commission on the
Evaluation of Pain, 50 SOC. SEC. BULL. 13 (Jan. 1987) [hereinafter Report] (for an abridged
version of the Commission's report).
3. Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1964). The Ber case is seen by many as
the most profound judicial opinion written on the subject of subjective pain testimony. The court
stated:
It is common knowledge that physical phenomena of a debilitative nature may work
differing degrees of hardship on different persons; and, too that even where the
amount of hardship experienced is roughly the same, persons subjected to it will
bear up under it differently because they possess relatively higher or lower
thresholds of resistance to the pain the debilitation generates. What one human
being may be able to tolerate as an uncomfortable but bearable burden may
constitute for another human being a degree of pain so unbearable as to subject him
to unrelenting misery of the worst sort.
Id. See Goldhammer & Bloom, Recent Changes in the Assessment of Pain in Disability Claims
Before the Social Security Administration, 3 SOC. SEC. REP. SER. 1119 (1984); Fried, A
Disability Appeal Primer:Appeals to Federal Court in Social Security and Supplemental Security
Income Disability Cases, 9 SOC. SEC. REP. SERV. 971 n.62 (1985).
4. REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 54. The Commission reports that
the only way for someone to measure the pain of another person is to note the suffering person's
outward manifestations of "pain behaviors," i.e., verbal and nonverbal expressions or physical
acts such as extensive reliance on pain medication. Id.
5. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 12, 14. See Goldhammer & Bloom, supra note 3 (noting
that subjective symptoms, such as pain, have created more controversy within the disability
determination process than any other issue).
6. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 15.
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should not be expected to work?" 7
This Comment will define and explain the confusion surrounding subjective
pain testimony in disability determination proceedings, primarily focusing on
the problems caused by Congress' approach to such testimony. Accordingly,
Section I provides background into the present problem. Section II follows
with a discussion of the disability determination process that claimants must
follow when seeking disability benefits. Section III outlines the Administration's policy on pain evaluation and its contribution to the present
problem. Section IV explores the fundamental objectives and the end result
of legislation passed by Congress in an effort to remedy the problem.
Finally, Section V makes a two-part recommendation to correct this
problem. The first part proposes legislation to address the importance of
pain testimony in the disability determination process. This legislation
emphasizes the relationship between a medically established impairment and
the degree of subjective pain alleged. The second part suggests regulations
which would require the Administration to consider the impact a claimant's
pain may have on his or her ability to function in everyday life before
denying benefits. The Comment's overall objective is to examine the
struggle of those parties participating in the disability determination process
and to highlight the need for Congressional action.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Problem
In 1956, Congress passed the Social Security Disability Insurance Act
(SSDI),5 the first of two federally funded programs enacted under the Social
Security Act." The second program, Supplemental Security Income (SSI),
was passed in 1972.10 The requirements for disability are the same under
both programs;" each program, however, has separate objectives.12 As
7. Id.
8. Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, § 103, 73 Stat. 807, 815-24
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. (1991)). This program is referred to as Title II-Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits, of the Social Security Acts.
9. The current Social Security Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1379 (1988).
10. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 1329, 1465-78
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1991)). This program is referred to
as Title XVI-Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, of the Social
Security Act.
11. Compare 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501-1599 (1989) (SSDI) with 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.90-998
(1989) (SSI).
12. While SSDI was enacted to provide assistance to those who had previously paid into the
social security system as employees participating through the Federal Insurance Contribution Act
(FICA), $SI was designed to aid aged, blind, or disabled indigent claimants. Eligibility under
SSI was based solely on financial need. See Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations:
Recommendations for Reform, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 464-65; Rubinson, Government
Benefits: Social Security Disability, 1987 Ann. Sur. Amer. L. 195, 196 (June 1988). Further
citations in this Comment will refer to SSDI claims.
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with most social legislation, rising costs began to overwhelm sound
objectives, and reform quickly followed.
Reacting to a sharp cost increase after the passage of SSI, 3 Congress
enacted the Social Security Amendments of 1980 as a way of containing both
SSI and SSDI.'4 The main thrust of the 1980 legislation was a requirement
that the Administration conduct eligibility reviews every three years. 5
Although the new eligibility review process was originally seen as a
promising way to protect taxpayers by "weeding out" those claimants no
longer legally disabled, the harsh reality of implementing the process soon
became clear: deserving claimants were having their benefits terminated. 16
In response to the escalating problem, Congress enacted the Social Security
Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (Reform Act). 7 The primary
motivation behind this legislation was the need for new standards to
determine the eligibility of both existing claimants and new applicants. 8
The basic purpose was to ensure uniformity among all the participants in the
disability benefits determination process by clarifying statutory guidelines.19
Congress hoped to provide a clear federal mandate to assist the Administration in its policy-making role.'m Other strong considerations included the
need for a more sympathetic and understanding appeal process and more
efficient administrative procedures.2 '
In particular, Section 3 of the Reform ActP (Section 3) was designed to
set forth a consistent and uniform framework for evaluating pain and other
13. Between 1957 and 1982, the Social Security Program's costs increased from $59 million
to $18.5 billion, and the number of eligible insurance recipients rose from 149,850 to 4,374,000.
See Rubinson, supra note 12, at 197 n. 14.
14. See Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 311(a), 94 Stat. 441
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 421(h)(1) (1988)). After passage of the Social Security
Amendments of 1980, the Administration began periodic eligibility reviews of then current
disability income beneficiaries. This legislation was received as a surprise to many because it
was seen as a way to cut-back on the number of eligible recipients, a goal uncommon to the
Carter administration. Today many blame the Reagan administration for the harsh results which
occurred under the Act. Yet, as noted, the Act was proposed by the Carter administration. The
difficult task of conducting the eligibility reviews, however, fell on the Reagan administration.
See 130 CONG. REc. 25975, 25976 (1984) (statement of Sen. Dole).
15. 130 CONG. REc. 25975 (1984) (statement of Sen Dole).
16. Id. The Act created a great deal of confusion and ended up causing more harm than good
because it lacked a concrete and uniform process for conducing the reviews. Within just three
years, this confusion resulted in the termination of approximately 500,000 recipients at the state
level. Of those who could afford an appeal to an administrative law judge, roughly 60% had
their benefits reinstated. Obviously, many benefits were wrongfully terminated.
17. Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat.
1794 (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Reform Act].
18. H.R. Rep. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3038, 3039 [hereinafter 1984 House Report].
19. Id. Congress was referring to the Administration's policies, those outlined in various
regulations and rulings, when it spoke of existing statutory guidelines.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Reform Act, supra note 17, § 3 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)
(1988)).
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symptoms in disability determination proceedings by codifying the Administration's existing policy on pain.' For individuals involved in these determination proceedings, Section 3 was the legislation's most promising feature
because it provided disability decision-makers with the first statutory
definition for pain evaluation,' and addressed the need for a comprehensive
study on the evaluation of pain.'
B. Illustrationsof the Problem
1. Administrative Review
To appreciate Congress' concern over subjective pain and the Administration's difficulty in handling claims of pain, consider the hypothetical case of
Joe Parker.' Mr. Parker worked on the docks as a longshoreman for fifteen
years but was forced to quit after he injured his back while hauling sacks of
grain. On the advice of his doctors, Mr. Parker underwent disc surgery.
Though he recuperated nicely, his doctors prescribed only light manual work
in the future. Fifteen months later, Mr. Parker found work as a cook and
counter person, but had to give up that job as well after falling and breaking
his hip. Mr. Parker claimed the fall aggravated the earlier back injury. As
a result, Mr. Parker has not worked for the past three years, claiming that
pain prevents him from performing even light work. Despite his claims of
debilitating pain, medical evidence indicates that both of Mr. Parker's
injuries have healed, at least to the point of permitting light to medium
work.?
Mr. Parker was denied state disability insurance benefits because he could
not show the existence of a medical impairment that could reasonably cause
the amount of pain he alleged. 2 He appealed the decision to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) only to have it affirmed despite corroborating
testimony from family, friends, and co-workers as to the existence of his
pain. Mr. Parker next pursued relief through the Appeals Council, but the
Council declined to review his claim. Distressed by the less than favorable
administrative outcome, Mr. Parker then brought an action in federal district
court. The district court accepted the AlJ's findings and affirmed the denial

23. 130 CONG. REC. 13214-15 (1984) (statement of Sen. Long).
24. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at v.
25. Id. at v-vi, 1. See infra Section IV.B for a discussion of the study.
26. The name and facts given here are purely hypothetical and are intended only to illustrate
the situation many claimants face.
27. Lower back pain and other muscoskeletal conditions are the leading causes of disability
for people in their working years. See INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 12.
28. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (1989) (classifying and describing work in the national
economy as either "sedentary," "light," "medium," "heavy," or "very heavy."); See also infra
text accompanying note 118.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 84-106.
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of benefits. Desperate, Mr. Parker appealed to the federal circuit court of
appeals.' ° The circuit court expressed dissatisfaction with the AU1's
handling of Mr. Parker's subjective complaints of pain. The court determined that there was sufficient objective evidence supporting a medical
impairment which would reasonably cause some amount of pain.31 The
court then reversed the AU's ruling and granted Mr. Parker disability
benefits, concluding that the ALJ is not permitted to disregard subjective
complaints of pain solely because objective medical evidence fails to confirm
the severity of such pain. 2
Mr. Parker's difficulties in receiving benefits are not atypical. In fact, the
determination process is more complex and the issues often more troubling
in an actual case. For years, inconsistent standards have been applied in
disability determination proceedings in which claimants complain of severe
or prolonged pain.33 State administrators working under the auspices of the

Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary), ALJs, and federal
courts all share in the confusion over what standard to apply when claimants
or enduring pain for which there is no objectively identifiable
allege severe
34
source.

This confusion and inconsistency results from the lack of a uniform
standard for evaluating pain among the various reviewing bodies. While the
Administration follows its own promulgations and rulings,3 5 federal courts

adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis and follow judicial precedent.'
Although the regulations recognize subjective pain, it is only to the extent the
pain is fully supported by objective evidence of an underlying medical
condition.37 Many federal courts, on the other hand, interpret the
Administration's policy differently, recognizing subjective pain testimony

30. See generally O'Byrne, How To Prepare the Social Security Disability Case, 35 PRAC.
LAW. 61 (Apr. 1986) (listing procedural steps claimants must follow in a disability determination
case).

31. See infra Section I.B.2.
32. The effects of this sort of a disparity in the review process can be personally devastating
to a claimant. Most claimants have little or no income, and for those who do, the appeals
process can be financially crippling. For those unable to pursue an appeal, their pain goes
unrecognized, and their lives often end in shambles. See 130 CONG. REC. 25979 (1984)
(statement of Sen. Levin) (The effect of having benefits wrongfully terminated and having to
then go through an exhaustive appeals process creates substantial personal grief and expense on
many claimants. For instance, many lose their homes or automobiles, some suffer worsened
medical conditions because of a lack of insurance, and a few go so far as to commit suicide.).
Id.
33. 1984 House Report, supra note 18, at 3050-55.
34. See id. at 3050-51.
35. See infra Section III.A.
36. This situation has created a problem all its own. See infra Section III.B.
37. See infra text accompanying note 160. Note that the Administration's policy, therefore,
falls' short of helping Mr. Parker and others like him.
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despite the absence of supporting medical evidence." However, the court
decisions themselves often conflict."
In addition, Congress' lack of
guidance in this area before 1984 compounded the problem.'
2. Judicial Review

Judicial interpretation of pain, both before and after the enactment of
Section 3, has magnified the problem. For example, over the last
twenty-five years the Ninth Circuit alone has gone from not requiring
objective medical evidence to support a claim of pain in full to requiring
fully supportive objective medical evidence of pain, back to not requiring it,

38. Page v. Celebrezze, 311 F.2d 757, 762-63 (5th Cir. 1963) (if pain resulting from any
medically determinable impairment is real to claimant and precludes his working in a
substantially gainful occupation, claimant is entitled to benefits despite fact that the pain is
unsupported by objective medical evidence); Ber, 332 F.2d at 299 ("Even pain unaccompanied
by any objectively observable symptoms which is nevertheless real to the sufferer and so intense
as to be disabling will support a claim for disability benefits."); Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d
107, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1981) (subjective pain may support a finding of disability despite fact that
the pain is not corroborated by objective medical proof); Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289,
292 (9th Cir. 1965) ("[s]ubjective symptoms of pain are a significant factor to be weighed when
determining 'disability'.. ."); Miranda v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 514 F.2d
996, 1000 (1st Cir. 1975) (pain may be disabling); Beavers v. Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare, 577 F.2d 383, 386 (6th Cir. 1978) (there is no requirement that an underlying
medical condition make the alleged pain inevitable); Northcutt v. Califano, 581 F.2d 164, 166
(8th Cir. 1978) (subjective pain allegations cannot be disregarded solely on the ground that they
are unaccompanied by objective medical evidence); Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975) ("Pain, in itself, may be a disabling
condition. .. ."); Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981) (pain may be disabling
and need not be fully supported by objective medical evidence); Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d
980, 983 (4th Cir. 1980) (ALJ should have evaluated impact of pain on disability claimant even
though its intensity was shown only by subjective evidence); Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d
835, 840 (11th Cir. 1982) (pain alone can be disabling, even when its existence is unsupported
by objective evidence).
39. Compare Stark v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 1974) (subjective pain
testimony is insufficient to establish disability) and Gonzalez v. Harris, 631 F.2d 143, 145 (9th
Cir. 1980) (allegations of pain must be supported by medical evidence) with Wiggins v.
Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (11th Cir. 1982) (pain need not be supported by objective
evidence and can support a finding of disability). See Goldhammer & Bloom, supra note 3
("Many decisions written on [subjective pain testimony] . . ., even in the same circuit, seem to
reach different results despite extremely similar factual situations. It seems as though one can
find at least one case for almost any proposition one proposes with respect to disability
claims.").
40. Prior to 1984, Title II of the Social Security Act made no mention of pain. Disability was
defined as "the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months."
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1988). The impairment could be demonstrated only by showing that
it "result[ed] from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(3) (1988). See infra note 83. The statute read further that "an individual shall not be
considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence as the
Secretary may require." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) (1988).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol28/iss1/12

6

1991]

SBuMIVE PAIN TESTIMONY INDISABILTY DETEIMINATION PROCEEDINGS

179

Rodgers: Subjective Pain Testimony in Disability
Proceedings
This vacillation
it again, and finally to not requiring it.4 Determination
then to requiring
reflects the confusion and inconsistency inherent in the Ninth Circuit's
approach to pain, and serves as a general illustration of the widespread and
continuing conflict over pain.
In 1985, the court decided the first Ninth Circuit case to interpret Section
3, Nyman v. Heckler.42 Nyman concluded that earlier circuit precedent was
consistent with Section 3's requirement of objective proof to support pain
testimony' and rejected the claimant's suggestion that the court adopt the
Eighth Circuit's pain standard, which recognized subjective pain testimony
even in the absence of medical evidence to support the claim in full."
However, the Eighth Circuit standard rejected in Nyman was the same
standard adopted by the court only six months later in Cotton v. Bowen.'
Not only did Cotton fail to follow Nyman, it completely rejected the Nyman
interpretation of Section 3:

This court has rejected that interpretation of

. .

. 423(d)(5)(A)

[Section 3]. 'We have never required that the medical evidence
identify an impairment that would make the pain inevitable.'
Requiring firm objective confirmation of pain complaints before
believing them 'would overlook the fact that pain is a highly
idiosyncratic phenomenon, varying according to the pain threshold
and stamina of the victim,' and it would trivialize the importance
that we have consistently ascribed to pain testimony, rendering it,
in the final analysis, almost superfluous. In enacting the Social
Security Disability Benefits Reform Act, Congress did not intend
to render the claimant's pain testimony irrelevant. 'Instead,
Congress clearly meant that so long as the pain is associatedwith
a clinically demonstrated impairment, credible pain testimony

41. See Mark, 348 F.2d at 292; Gonzalez, 631 F.2d at 145-46; Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d
1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986); Bates, 894 F.2d 1059, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled, Bunnell
v. Sullivan, 1191 WL 191634, at *5-6 (9th Cir. 1991).
42. 779 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1985).
43. See Gonzalez, 631 F.2d at 145 (claimant's pain allegations must be supported by objective
medical evidence). But see Mark, 348 F.2d at 292 (While claimant must show the existence of
a medical condition, the Secretary is not permitted, "under the guise of 'medically determinable
impairment,' to approach the determination of 'disability'. . . from an exclusively technical
viewpoint, thereby sacrificing realities of the individual case to [a] rigid requirement of a
preponderance of objective clinical findings.").
44. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984) ("While the claimant has
the burden of proving that the disability results from a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment, direct medical evidence of the cause and effect relationship between the impairment
and the degree of claimant's subjective complaints need not be produced. The adjudicator may
not disregard a claimants subjective complaints solely because the objective medical evidence
does not fully support them.").
45: 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986).
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should contribute to a determination of disability. '4

47
Cotton recognized what the Ninth Circuit refers to as "excess pain."

This term of art aptly describes situations in which disability claimants can

objectively establish the existence of a physical or mental impairment, but not
one which could reasonably be expected to produce the amount of pain
claimed." Instead of following Nyman, the Cotton opinion confirmed the
Ninth Circuit's earlier position which considered claimants' subjective
allegations of pain despite the absence of supporting objective proof 4 9 The
court reasoned that pain may be so severe as to be disabling, and therefore,
it would be unjust to discard claimants' complaints when determining
disability simply because the etiology of the pain is not completely substantiated by objective evidence." There is no clear explanation for the sharp
contrast between Nyman and Cotton.5 Both cases interpreted Section 3 in
light of pain testimony and reached different conclusions.
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit decided Bates v. Sullivan.52 Bates rejected
excess pain testimony and Cotton's interpretation of Section 3V3 In Bates,
the concurrence u opined that Section 3 cannot be read to permit the court's
adoption and acceptance of excess pain testimony in disability insurance
benefits cases:
46. Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407 (quoting Howard, 782 F.2d at 1488). Most of the Ninth Circuit
cases refer to the codified version of Section 3, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). See also Bunnell,
1991 WL 191634, at * 5-6 (explaining the NymanlCotton inconsistency).
47. See Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407.
48. Id.
49. See Howard, 782 F.2d at 1488 (describing excess pain but not yet giving it that name)
This is basically the Eigth Circuit's standard.
50. Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407 ("If the claimant submits objective medical findings establishing
a medical impairment that would normally produce a certain amount of pain, but testifies that
she experiences pain at a higher level (hereinafter referred to as the claimant's 'excess pain'),
the Secretary is free to disbelieve that testimony, but must make specific findings justifying that
decision. 'Excess pain' is, by definition, pain that is unsupported by objective medical findings.
If the Secretary were free to disbelieve excess-pain testimony solely on the ground that it was
not supported by objective medical findings, then the Secretary would be free to reject all excess
pain testimony.").
The court's decision in Cotton appears well-reasoned; however, one Ninth Circuit judge has
declared the decision a marked departure from circuit precedent. See infra note 57.
Furthermore, just one year earlier, the court had expressed an opposite view. See Swanson v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 763 F.2d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 1985) (In determining
whether claimant has suffered a 'disability' within the meaning of the Social Security Act,
Secretary need not accept claimant's subjective allegations of pain if they are unsupported by
objective findings.).
51. In fact, Howard, decided between Nyman and Cotton and setting the stage for Cotton, was
decided less than two months after Nyman and ten days before Nyman was amended.
52. 894 F.2d 1059. The majority opinion was authored by Judge David Thompson; however,
it was the majority in result only. On the issue of what standard to apply to a claimant's
subjective pain testimony, the majority consisted of Judges Wright and Wallace. Their
concurring opinion is actually the majority decision on this issue. See Rice v. Sullivan, 912
F.2d 1076, 1083, n.4 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and renanded, Bunnell, 1991 WL 191634, at *6.
53. Bates, 894 F.2d at 1066-72 (concurrence).
54. See generally supra note 52.
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Significantly, the lanugage of the statute uses a definite article,
referring to 'the pain' alleged. It does not refer to 'some of the
pain' alleged by the claimant, nor does it refer to medical
impairments expected to produce 'a certain amount of pain,' nor
to 'excess pain.' Thus, read in its most direct and plain sense,
section... 423(d)(5)(A) requires evidence of a medical condition
which 'could reasonably be expected to produce' the actual pain,
in amount and degree, alleged by the claimant. Unless a claimant
can produce 'objective medical evidence of' such a medical

impairment, he or she is not disabled under the statute. 55

In support of their conclusion, the concurring judges embarked on an
extensive analysis of Section 3's legislative history.' They claimed the
"excess pain" approach adopted by the court in Cotton was exactly the
approach57rejected by Congress during the debates surrounding Section 3's
passage.
The judges blamed the inconsistent holdings of the circuit's pain cases on
a failure to follow binding authority.58 They explicitly stated that the Cotton
line of cases 59 created a conflict within the circuit.' However, rather than
commanding an en banc rehearing, the concurrence found that the Cotton
line of cases could remain good law.61 They determined a rehearing en banc
was unnecessary because the cases could be distinguished on the basis of
their date of decision.62 An outright reversal, therefore, was unnecessary.

The concurring judges cleverly distinguished the Cotton line of cases by
noting that section 3's sunset provision' made it applicable only to cases
decided on or before December 31, 1986.' 4 They argued that those cases

55. Bates, 894 F.2d at 1066 (concurrence).
56. Id. at 1072 (concurrence). Much of the legislative history cited in the Bates concurrence

is discussed infra in Section IV.A.
57. Id. at 1070-71 (concurrence) ("As the legislative history makes clear, section 423(d)(5)(A)

[Section 3] was drafted in an attempt to avoid the result advocated by Cotton rather than
command it.... In sum, Cotton is a complete departure from both the plain language of section
423(d)(5)(A) and its legislative history.").
58. See id. at 1069. ("[Judge Thompson's] disagreement with our reasoning, we believe,
stems from his failure to follow the binding authority cited earlier.... The frst case to depart
from our circuit precedent was Howard v. Heckler.").
59. See Cotton; Howard; Varney v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 581

(9th Cir. 1988); Stewart v. Sullivan, 881 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1989); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d
597 (9th Cir. 1989).
60. Bates, 894 F.2d at 1071 (concurrence) ("Under section 423(d)(5)(A), we are unable to
devise a way to distinguish this case from our circuit's controlling authority-Nyman, Taylor,
and Miller. We therefore conclude that Cotton and its progeny . . . create a clear circuit

conflict.").
61. Id. ("Unless there is some way to distinguish Cotton, we would be obliged to request a
rehearing en banc. But we believe there is a way.").

62. Id.
63.

See Reform Act, supra note 19, § 3(a)(3).

64. Bates, 894 F.2d at 1071.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991

9

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

California Western Law Review, Vol. 28 [1991], No. 1, Art. 12

were in line with the requirements of the now defunct Section

3 .'

The

judges, therefore, reasoned that Bates should be decided in light of the

Secretary's regulations and rulings rather than prior case law.' After
concluding that the regulations67 do not permit a finding of disability based
on anything other than medical evidence supporting the claim in full, they
rejected Bates' claim and affirmed the Secretary's ruling.s
In a recent rehearing en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit recently
overruled Bates and reaffirmed Cotton in Bunnell v. Sullivan. 9 In doing
so, the court held that the appropriate standard for evaluating subjective pain
testimony requires claimants to produce objective medical evidence of an
underlying impairment which is reasonably likely to cause their pain.'
Once such evidence is produced, an AU is not permitted to then disregard
their subjective complaints solely because the medical evidence fails to
corroborate the full extent of the pain alleged.71 The court reaffirmed the

familiar Cotton standard after concluding that it was, and always had been,
consistent with both Congress' and the Administration's approach to pain.'

65. Bates, 894 F.2d at 1071 (concurrence) ("Thus, we may distinguish Cotton and its progeny
on the ground that they were based upon a statute that does not apply to the determination
rendered in this case."). The sunset provision made Section 3 inapplicable to Bates because the
Appeals Council's decision denying the claimant's benefits was rendered on May 31, 1987. Id.
For similar arguments see Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1988) and McCormick v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services, 861 F.2d 998 (6th Cir. 1988).
66. Bates, 894 F.2d at 1071 ("The fact that the expiration of section 423(d)(5)(A) does not
change the law concerning subjective pain testimony does not, of course, suggest that Cotton's
standard can somehow be read into the Secretary's regulation. Rather, we must examine the
language of the Secretary's regulations independent of the case law interpreting section
423(d)(5)(A).").
67. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1989).
68. Id. at 1072 ("The statute and regulations determine what disability is for purposes of the
statutory and regulatory schemes. Our responsibility is to follow the statute and determine
whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to affirm the Secretary's decision.
We hold that there is."). The concurrence was agreeing with the result of the case but not with
the reasoning.
69. Bunnell, 1991 WL 191634, at *2 ("We conclude the concurring opinion in Bates
misconstrued the relevant law, and thus erroneously rejected the standard for evaluating pain as
adopted by this circuit in Cotton.")
70. Id. at *2.
71. Id. The court outright rejected the earlier standard requiring objective medical evidence
of an underlying impairment as well as objective medical evidence to corroborate the severity
of the pain alleged.
72. Id. at *6. It is submitted that although the standard adopted by the court in Bunnell is the
more reasonable standard and the one preferred by this comment, it is nevertheless inconsistent
with Congress' past intentions and the Administration's current mandates. For in-depth analyses
of why the Cotton standard is inconsistent with Section 3 and the current regulations and rulings,
see Bates, 894 F.2d at 1064-68 and Bunnell, 1991 WL 191634, at *I0 (concurrence) ("Hard as
it may be for my colleagues to believe, Congress actually made a hard policy judgment and
directed the SSA to deny disability benefits in dubious cases. It may not be the policy judgment
that makes sense to us, but we are not empowered to second-guess this judgment simply because
we are incredulous that Congress chose the path it did."). In an effort to remedy the
inconsistency, this comment proposes to Congress and the Administration that they both adopt
standards which will effectively permit the federal courts to apply the more reasonable Cotton
standard. See infra text accompanying notes 223-36.
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3. Malingering
The confusion of those persons charged with the responsibility for
determining disability based on pain is not surprising.' Pain has been
referred to as "the great unknown factor" of the disability determination
process.74 And, because there is no objective measuring stick available to
measure the degree of pain felt by a particular individual, there is also no
way to be objectively certain the individual indeed is suffering.' Medical
experts have termed those persons who attempt to defraud the Administration
by deliberately faking their disability, "malingerers." 76 Malingering may
be the Administration's greatest fear in relation to its disability program
because the government can not financially afford to promote, even
indirectly, such a practice by granting benefits to those persons not truly
disabled. 7 Medical experts, however, have concluded that malingering is
not a serious threat to the disability determination process because trained
health care professionals can identify malingerers early in the disability
determination process with medical and psychological tests.78
II. DIsABILrrY DETERMINATION PROCESS

Claimants seeking disability insurance benefits must be prepared to deal
with bureaucratic red-tape.79 The disability determination process begins
at a state administrative agency and could conceivably end before the United

73. Goldhammer & Bloom, supra note 3. In defense of the Administration's policy, the
authors state:
Considering then, that expressions of 'subjective pain' may well not reflect the
individual's true state of capacity, there is much to say for an approach which
largely ignores subjective expressions of pain and dysfunction and relics primarily
upon that medical evidence which can be independently verified and assessed as
producing a medically legitimate state of incapacity.
Id. at 19.

74. Comment, ProvingDisabling Pain in Social Security Disability Proceedings: The Social
Security Administration and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 22 DUQ. L. REV. 491, 498
(1984) [hereinafter Proving Disabling Pain].
is extremely difficult to distinguish that
75. Goldhanmer and Bloom, supra note 3. "[I]t
degree of ache and pain which the individual really could tolerate, if he had to do so, from that
degree of pain which is truly tolerable."). The author points out that "[a]fter a serious injury,
because human vulnerability is discovered, there is a natural tendency to magnify every twitch
and ache and pain without knowing whether these sensations prevent activity.... [S]ome degree
of pain may well evaporate when the individual is actually faced with concerted activity." Id.
at 18.
76. REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 59.

77. See generally Goldhammer & Bloom, supra note 3.
78. REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 59-60.
79. See Levy, supra note 12, at 467-68.
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States Supreme Court.'o For this reason, not only must claimants make a
mental commitment toward fighting "the bureaucrats" for their benefits, but
also they must make a financial sacrifice if they wish to appeal should they
initially be denied benefits. The complexity and extent of the determination
process, particularly the numerous levels of review, provide ample opportunity for the confusion over subjective pain testimony to manifest itself in
inconsistent and contradictory decisions.
A. Administrative Process
The Social Security Act81 defines disability as the "inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months."' The Social Security Act's definition of a "physical or
mental impairment" requires claimants to show proof of "an impairment
which results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities
which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques."'
The difficult and frustrating situation many claimants face becomes clear
upon close examination of the Administration's disability determination
process. Further use of the hypothetical case of Joe Parker' illustrates this
detailed procedural maze. For Mr. Parker, the administrative process began
when he filed his disability claim at one of the Administration's many district
or branch offices. 5 After gathering information relevant to Mr. Parker's
claim," the state branch office transferred the claim to a state Disability

80. O'Byme, supra note 30, at 64. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, rarely grants
certiorari in disability determination cases. See Levy, supra note 12, at 475 n. 78.
81.

See INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 38.

82. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1) (1988). One article suggests that much of the controversy between
the Administration and the federal judiciary results from differing interpretations of this statute;
e.g., while the Administration focuses on the terms "by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment", the courts appear more concerned with the words "inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity." See Goldhammer & Bloom, supra note 3, at 19. The
authors note that "[firom the court's perspective, a worker who can't use his legs because he
is in too much pain to walk is just as disabled as the individual who is missing both of his legs,
even though the former lacks the objective evidence to justify his inability to walk." Id.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) (1988).
84. See supra Section I.B. 1.
85. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 42. According to the Institute's report, in 1987, there
were about 1.5 million claimants who filed claims with one of the more than 1,300 branch
offices. These offices are designed to handle initial application procedures only. Office
employees assist claimants in filling out forms as well as by determining claimants' work history
and medical background, and advising them of their rights and responsibilities throughout the
process. Id. at 42-43.
86. Relevant information includes past work experience and the names of any treating
physicians. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol28/iss1/12

12

1991]

185Proceedings
Rodgers: Subjective Pain Testimony in Disability Determination

SUBJECTIVE PAIN TESTIMONY IN DISABILITY DETERMINATION PROCEEDINGS

Determination Service agency (DDS). 7
The DDS is responsible for making the first disability determination.88
This initial procedure is conducted by an "evaluation team"" within the
DDS.
In Mr. Parker's case, the evaluation team first developed his
disability file, composed of the information forwarded from the district or
branch office together with any information deemed pertinent by the DDS. 91
This process and the initial application procedure at the branch offices,
primarily consist of the compilation of paperwork and are purposefully

devoid of subjectivity' because the ultimate purpose is to determine
whether Mr. Parker is objectively disabled within the meaning of the law. 3
Next, the evaluation team considered Mr. Parker's condition to determine if
he was disabled using a detailed, five-step process entitled the "sequential
evaluation process."' This process95 is required by law,' and is applicable to all initial determination decisions. 97

The first step required the evaluation team to determine Mr. Parker's
present occupational status.98 The evaluation team then considered whether

87. Id. at 43. See also Levy, supra note 12, at 468.
88. See id.
89. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 43. The evaluation team consists of two persons; one
is an administrator, referred to as the "disability examiner," and the other is a doctor. While
the disability examiner is present to ensure conformity with the legal and administrative
requirements for disability, the doctor's primary duty is to make a determination as to whether
the claimant is in fact medically disabled. The doctor is a licensed physician who is usually
either a general practitioner and/or an internist. Note that neither a general practitioner nor an
internist is trained in the intricacies of pain evaluation. Id.
90. Id.
91. It is not uncommon for the DDS to order the claimant to undergo a medical examination
conducted by a physician paid for by the Administration. Id. See also Levy, supra note 12, at
468. The Administration is permitted by law to require this of a claimant. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1517 (1989). It must be noted that although the Administration can require a consultative
examination and is not bound by conclusions reached by a claimants treating physician, federal
courts accord a great deal of deference to a treating physician's testimony. See Fair, 885 F.2d
at 604 (holding that a treating physician's opinion is entitled to "special weight"); Cotton, 799
F.2d at 1408 (concluding that although an ALI is not bound by a treating physician's determinations as to the claimants disability, the AJ is required to "provide a reasoned rationale for
disregarding a particular treating physician's findings").
92. See 1984 House Report, supra note 18, at 3043 ("The initial decision is made according
to the submitted clinical findings, a deliberate paper decision that avoids as much as possible the
personal influence of either the claimant or his physician.").
93.

Id. at 3043-44.

94. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 43. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1989).
95. Each step asks the evaluation team a question. Depending on whether the answer is yes
or no, the team moves on to the next question. Failure to satisfy a particular question results
in an automatic denial of benefits without consideration of any of the remaining questions or any
of the claimant's subjective complaints, including pain. See REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF
PAIN, supra note 2, at 13.
96. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1989).
97. REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 13.
98. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 45.
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Mr. Parker was "currently engaging in substantial gainful activity?"' Once
the evaluation team was satisfied that Mr. Parker was not presently gainfully
employed, the process moved on to step two. 100
Step two asks whether Mr. Parker's impairment or combination of
impairments" 1 was severe." Under the evaluation process Mr. Parker's
condition would be considered severe if his back and hip injuries had "more
than a minimal effect on [his] ability to perform basic work activities,""
including "sitting, standing, walking, lifting, pushing, pulling, handling,
seeing, hearing, communicating, and understanding and following simple
instructions" 1" and if Mr. Parker was able to show that these impairments
were reasonably capable of producing his pain."0 5 However, because the
objective findings failed to show that his injuries were reasonbaly capable of
causing the severity of pain he alleged, the evaluation team concluded that

99. REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 13. Substantial gainful activity
is defined as "work that involves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties and
is done for pay or profit." INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 45. The Commission On the
Evaluation of Pain reports that generally, claimants claiming in excess of $300 per month are
considered "substantially" employed. See REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note
2, at 13. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510, 404.1571-75 (1989).
100.
If the evaluation team finds that the claimant is presently gainfully employed, the
process halts and benefits are automatically denied.
101.
See Reform Act, supra note 17, § 4(c) (amending § 223(d)(2) of the Social Security
Act):
In determining whether an individual's physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of a sufficient medical severity that such an impairment or
impairments could be the basis of eligibility under this section, the Secretary shall
consider the combined effect of all the individual's impairments without regard to
whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of such a
severity. If the Secretary does find a medically severe combination of impairments, the combined impact of the impairments shall be considered throughout the
disability determination process.
102.
INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 45.
103.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b) (1989).
104.
REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 13. See generally 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520 (1989).
105.
Id. It is submitted that this is the point at which the evaluation process places an
overly harsh burden on claimants. By focusing solely on objective proof of a claimant's pain,
the Administration effectively denies benefits without considering the pain itself and its
subjective effect upon a particular claimant. Others have agreed with this assessment of the
process:
Under the sequential evaluation of disability, one cannot reach the question of
effect on functioning; i.e., can the individual sit, stand, walk, etc., until one first
decides there are appropriate signs and findings, as opposed to symptoms, showing
a 'severe' impairment.
iBiecause of the order in which the regulations must be applied, they operate to
prevent a finding of disability based primarily on subjective reasons, such as pain.
Goldhamnmer and Bloom, supra note 3, at 3-4. See infra text accompanying notes 227-36 for
a discussion of how the Administration can remedy this problem.
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his impairment was not "severe" and denied him benefits." °6
To gain an understanding of the entire process, consider at this point that
Mr. Parker's impairment was, in fact, determined severe by the evaluation
team. In such a case, the evaluation team would begin Step 3. This would
require an elaborate analysis of Mr. Parker's disability file, comparing the
information it contained to the Administration's "Listing of Impairments"

(Listing)."ar The Listing provides a detailed compilation of medical conditions'05 that the Administration considers severe, 09 and which, in the
absence of substantial gainful activity, allow for a presumption of disability."0 If any of the objective findings contained in Mr. Parker's medical file
matched with a condition's listed symptoms, signs, or laboratory findings,' then he would be presumed disabled based on the medical evidence
alone.12 Mr. Parker also may be considered disabled, however, if his
is of equal severity or duration as that of one of the listed
alleged impairment
13
conditions.
At this point, if Mr. Parker's impairment is considered severe, but does not
match one of the conditions in the Listing, the evaluation team would

106.
Under step 2, when the objective findings fail to substantiate an underlying physical
impairment reasonably capable of producing the pain alleged, a determination on the possibility
for an underlying mental impairment causing the pain is required See generally 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(1989) for evaluation of mental impairments.
REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 14. The Listing can be found
107.
at 20 C.F.R. Appendix I to Subpart P (1989).
108.
INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 39. The Administration has listed over 100 medical
conditions and arranged them according to 13 major body systems. Id.
109.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 14. The

level of severity required for each condition considered a severe impairment is determined by
signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings. Id. See infra note Ill for a definition of these terms.
110.
INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 39.
111.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1528 (1989) defines symptoms as "your own description of your
physical or mental impairment. Your statements alone are not enough to establish that there is
a physical or mental impairment." Signs are defined as "anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which can be observed, apart from your statements (symptoms).
Signs must be shown by medically acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques. Psychiatric signs
are medically demonstrable phenomena which indicate specific abnormalities of behavior, affect
thought, memory, orientation and contact with reality. They must also be shown by observable
facts that can be medically described and evaluated." Id. And, laboratoryfindings are defined
as "anatomical, physiological, or psychological phenomena which can be shown by the use of
medically acceptable laboratory diagnostic techniques. Some of these diagnostic techniques
include chemical tests, electrophysiological studies (electrocardiogram, electroencephalogram,
etc.), roentgenological studies (x-rays), and psychological tests." Id.
112.

REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 14; INST. OF MED., supra

note 1, at 45.
113.
Id. note 1, at 45. The Listing lists a few conditions which require the team to
consider pain at this point in the sequential evaluation process. In other words, to establish a
severe impairment on the basis of one of these conditions, the claimant must allege pain as a
disabling factor. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, app. 1 § 1.05 (1989). Note that the type
of pain referred to in the Listing is "acute," rather than "chronic" pain. See infra text
accompanying note 206.
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proceed to the fourth and fifth steps. 4 These steps would require consideration of the impact of various vocational factors on Mr. Parker's ability to
perform basic work activities, despite the limitations caused by the severe
impairment.' 15 This remaining ability has been termed the claimant's
"residual functional capacity."' 16
When determining Mr. Parker's residual functional capacity," 7 the
evaluation team would first consider his ability to perform basic exertional
activities, those requiring some degree of physical strength."'
The
evaluation team would then attempt to determine whether Mr. Parker was
capable of performing his previous job, considering his residual functional
capacity and the requirements of his past work environment. 1 9 If the
evaluation team determined that Mr. Parker was unable to return to his past
occupation, then the team would proceed to step five. 120
114.
REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 14-15; see also INST. OF
MED., supra note 1, at 45. Question 4 asks, "Does the Individual Have the Residual Functional
Capacity to Perform Past Relevant Work?" and question 5 asks, "Does the Individual Have the
Residual Functional Capacity to Perform Other Work?" REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN,
supra note 2, at 15-16.
115.
REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 15-16.
116.
Id. at 16. Residual functional capacity is measured by the claimant's ability to
perform the basic work activities listed in step two despite the restrictions imposed by the severe
unpairment.
117.
Evaluation of the claimant's residual functional capacity is based on medical signs and
laboratory findings but includes the claimant's own symptoms as well. If the claimant alleges
dysfunctional pain beyond that medically substantiated, the team may make "reasonable
conclusions" about the effect the pain may have on the claimant's basic work activities. This
would entail consideration of the claimant's own description of the pain and its severity and the
limitations imposed on the claimant, the medication taken by the claimant, including the type and
dosage, and the claimant's current daily activities. See id.
118.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (1989) classifies jobs in the national economy based on the
jobs' physical work requirements. The classifications range from "sedentary" to "very heavy"
work. If the evaluation team had determined that Mr. Parker's impairment was severe but did
not affect his ability to perform exertional activities, it would have then considered any
nonexertional limitations resulting from the impairment, such as Mr. Parker's ability to apply
cognitive thought in a routine work setting. Id. at 15. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, app. 2,
§ 200.00(e) (1989), explains that those impairments which might not cause any exertional
limitations include certain mental, sensory, or skin impairments.
119.
When the claimant alleges functional limitations, the evaluation team will rely on
Medical-Vocational Guidelines ("grids") in making the disability determination. The grids
contain objective guidelines for determining the claimant's exertional limitations by classifying
various jobs found in the national economy based on the amount of physical strength required
to perform such jobs. The grids also classify jobs according to the skill required for
performance. In determining the claimant's nonexertional limitations, the grids provide a
standard framework. See INST. OF MED, supra note 1, at 46. See generally 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, app. 2 (1989).
120.
The process never reaches step five if the claimant is found capable of performing his
past work; however, an opposite finding does not halt the process in favor of the claimant. The
evaluation team must then proceed to step five. If a claimant were appealing an adverse ruling,
it is at this point that the burden of proof would shift to the Secretary. In all disability
determination proceedings, the claimant bears the ultimate burden of proving his disability;
however, once the claimant satisfies step four by proving his inability to perform past work, the
burden then shifts to the Secretary to prove the claimant is capable of performing other work.
See River v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 719, 722-23 (2d Cir. 1983); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d
1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Heaney, Why the High Rate ofReversals in Social Security
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Step five would require the evaluation team to consider Mr. Parker's
residual functional capacity to determine whether he was capable of
In addition to exertional and nonexertional
performing other work.'
capability, under step five, the evaluation team would consider Mr. Parker's
age, education, and prior work experience." If the evaluation team did
not consider Mr. Parker disabled by the time it reached the end of step five,
then Mr. Parker would be denied benefits."z The state agency would then
send Mr. Parker an "initial denial determination" letter which would inform
him of his right to seek review of his claim by the agency." This review
procedure is entitled "reconsideration"" : and would represent Mr. Parker's
first attempt to challenge the initial state agency decision.'2
The reconsideration procedure is conducted by a new team of evaluators
who repeat the five-step sequential evaluation process."z Mr. Parker
would be permitted to introduce additional evidence and could claim that his
condition had worsened since the initial determination."2 If Mr. Parker
was determined not disabled once again by the state agency," 2 he would
be sent a "reconsideration denial" letter which would advise him of his right
to request a hearing before an ALJ."
B. Appeals Process
There are several levels of review available to Mr. Parker. The first,
reconsideration, is discussed above. After reconsideration, Mr. Parker, and
other claimant's who have been denied disability benefits, may proceed
through administrative and judicial review.

Disability Cases?, 1 SOC. SEC. REP. SEP. 1133 (1983).
121.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1566 (1989) defines other work as any job existing in the national
economy which is currently available in significant numbers in either the region where the

claimant lives or in many regions of the country.

For a discussion of how courts should

evaluate the terms significant numbers, see Barker v. Secretary of Health & Human Services,

882 F.2d 1474, 1478 (9th Cir. 1989).
122. REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 17. Age is the most
predominate consideration at this point, and the Administration automatically considers those
claimants "55 and over" unable to begin a new job requiring skills different than those required
by the claimant's previous job. See INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 46. See generally 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1563(d) (1989).
123.
The Institute of Medicine reports that of the 1.5 million claimants receiving an initial
determination each year, 60% are denied benefits. See INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 4647.

124.

O'Byrne, supra note 30, at 62.

125.
Roughly half of those claimants initially denied benefits will seek reconsideration of
their claims. See INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 47.

126.
127.
128.

Levy, supra note 12, at 470.
INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 47.
Id.

129.

Eighty-percent of the claimants seeking reconsideration will be denied benefits for the

second time. Roughly 70% of those denied will request a hearing before an AUJ. Id.
130.

See O'Byrne, supra note 30, at 62.
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1. Administrative review. A hearing before one of the Administration's
many ALJs offers Mr. Parker another chance to receive benefits. Fortunately, he has many advantages on his side during the hearing. First, although
the AL is bound to follow the law according to the Social Security Act, and
the Administration's regulations and rulings,' the ALJ conducts a de novo
review of the case" and will admit new evidence offered by the claimant,
including, but not limited to, the presentation of witnesses in his favor."
Second, in making a decision,"M the AU conducts its own sequential
evaluation process based on the record and any new evidence submitted by
the claimant.' 35 Finally, the hearing is informal, and although Mr. Parker
has the right to be represented by counsel at all times, the Administration is
not so represented." If the AU concludes that Mr. Parker is disabled,"3
then benefits will be awarded. If, however, the ruling is adverse, Mr.
Parker may seek review before the Administration's Appeals Council.
The Appeals Council is Mr. Parker's last opportunity for administrative
relief.' If the Appeals Council chooses to hear a case, 39 its review will
ordinarily be limited to the record developed by the AU and the claimant's
disability file."4 The Appeals Council may permit Mr. Parker to submit
further additional evidence; this occurs, however, only in exceptional
"'
cases. 41
If the Appeals Council affirms the AL's decision, then Mr.
Parker's
next
hope for an award of benefits lies with the federal judiciary. 142
2. JudicialReview. For Mr. Parker, the federal process begins in district
court. The district court, however, acts as an appellate, rather than as a trial

131.
REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 25.
132.
Levy, supra note 12, at 471.
133.
INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 47.
134.
It must be kept in mind that this is probably the first time the claimant appears in
person during the disability determination process. See Levy, supra note 12, at 471. For this
reason, the ALl is confronted not only with the objective evidence and findings, but also with
his own subjective observations of the claimant credibility, therefore, becomes a key factor at
this stage of the process. But see, supra note 92.
135.
INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 47.
136.
REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 25.
137.
The Institute of Medicine reports that the ALJ overturns agency decisions and awards
benefits in about half of all disability cases. See INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 47.
138.
REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 26.
139.
Review by the Appeals Council is discretionary. The Appeals Council may deny a
claimant's request for review or it might possibly hear the case on its own motion. See INST.
OF MED., supra note 1, at 47.
140.
REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 26.
141.
Id. In extremely rare cases, the Appeals Council may allow the claimant to be
present.
142.
Id. This right is recognized by 42 U.S.C. § 205(g) (1988). The Social Security Act
provides that appeals from administrative decisions are procedurally no different than ordinary
civil appeals. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988); see also Levy, supra note 12, at 475 n.78.
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court during the review.14 3 Thus, the district court conducts a "paper
review"'" of the Administration's findings and makes its final decision
based on whether the AL's decision was supported by substantial evidence
and was free from legal error.145 If the district court affirms the AU's

decision, Mr. Parker may appeal to a circuit court of appeals.'" Like the
district court, the circuit court determines whether the AL's decision was
based on substantial evidence. 47 When confronted with a case involving
pain testimony in which the claimant alleges pain beyond that which is
medically documented, circuit courts look to see whether the AUJ "convincingly justif[ied] his rejection" of the claimant's testimony." 1 " A rejection
based solely on the absence of objective evidence to support the degree of
pain alleged is not sufficient to satisfy this standard. 49 However, if the
AL! makes specific findings for rejecting a claim, and those findings are

143.
INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 76. For additional insight into the review process,
see, Comment, JudicialReview of Social Security DisabilityDecisions: A Proposalfor Change,
11 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 215, 227 (1980).
144.
INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 76.
145.
Id. at 77.
146.
REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 26.
147.
Elam v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1213 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.").
148.
Stewart, 881 F.2d at 743; see also Fair,885 F.2d at 602 (concluding that before an
ALI can reject a claimant's excess pain claim, not only must he make specific findings justifying
his decision, but also the findings must "convincingly justify his rejection" of the claim.).
Excess pain is pain the claimant alleges beyond that which is identifiable by objective medical
evidence. See supra note 46 for a more precise definition.
In a proceeding before an ALU in which the claimant alleges excess pain, the AL's
assessment of the claimant's credibility is extremely important because excess pain, by
definition, invites falsehood. As noted by the Fair court:
excess pain cases often hinge entirely on whether or not the claimant's description
of what he is feeling is believed. In making this determination, the AL must walk
a narrow path, as serious harm can flow from error in either direction. On one
side, incorrect denials of benefits can leave deserving claimants, who are often in
precarious financial conditions, without a crucial source of income. On the other,
erroneous grants of benefits reward liars at public expense, waste resources that
could be put to any number of more productive uses, and may ultimately reduce
the level of funding available for people who are legitimately disabled. The public
interest is ill-served by either type of mistake.
Fair, 885 F.2d at 602. Although credibility determinations are indeed important, many courts
will not permit an AL to find a claimant not credible simply because medical evidence does not
fully support the degree of pain alleged. See supra note 38. This, however, is not to say that
circuit courts act as triers of fact; to the contrary, "[credibility determinations are within the
province of the AU." Fair, 885 F.2d. at 604. As the Faircourt explains, it is not sufficient
for an AL to find a claimant not credible merely because of a lack of objective medical
evidence; however, this fact, when coupled with contradicting testimony to the effect that the
claimant has been functioning quite well in his everyday life and has made no attempt to
alleviate his pain through treatment or medication, will justify the AL's decision denying
benefits. Id. at 603-04.
149.
Id. at 602. ("And, as we have repeatedly stated, the AL may not discredit pain
testimony merely because a claimant's reported degree of pain is unsupported by objective
medical findings.").
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supported by substantial evidence in the record, the circuit court will affirm
the denial of benefits. 1" As noted above,
it is at this point that Mr. Parker
151
may appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
III. THE ADMINISTRATION'S PAIN POLICY

The Administration's specific policy on pain is outlined in various
regulations and "in-house" rulings, which are binding on all Administration employees, including ALJs. 153 These rulings are designed to assist
employees in administering programs and in implementing policy. While
federal courts are not required to follow the Administration's rulings, the
regulations are accorded judicial notice." This, however, does not require
judicial recognition of the agency's interpretation of the regulations.155
A. Regulations and Rulings
During the 1980s, the Administration revised some of its regulations and
made changes to some of its internal policies to better clarify its pain
policy."z Its efforts were intended to end the conflict over subjective pain
testimony between the Administration and the federal judiciary. 57 These
clarifications solidified the Administration's commitment to a disability policy
based primarily on objective medical evidence. 58 Thus, the Administr-

Id. at 604.
150.
See supra note 80. Claimants should be aware that the Supreme Court affords great
151.
deference to an administrative agency's construction of a statute which the particular agency is
empowered to enforce. See United States v. Hammers, 221 U.S. 220 (1911). Note that this
rule would hold true for an ALJ's interpretation of Congress' pain statute.
152.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508 (1989); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528 (1989); 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529 (1989); Social Security Ruling 82-58 (1982) [hereinafter SSR 82-58] (superseded by
Social Security Ruling 88-131); Program Operations Manual System (POMS) DI T00401.570.
POMS provide detailed administrative instructions for the Administration's employees to follow
in making disability determinations; however, ALJs are not bound by them. See Goldhammer
& Bloom, supra note 3. For a well-written discussion on SSR 82-58 and POMS DI T00401.570,
see Avery v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 797 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1986).
20 C.F.R. § 422.408 (1989).
153.
154.
44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1988).
155.
See Rosofsky v. Schweiker, 523 F. Supp. 1180, 1188 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
156.
INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 51. Part of the reason for the changes was likely due
to the significant number of disability cases in which pain was a major factor.
157.
See Pryor, Compensation and the EradicableProblems of Pain, 50 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 239, 261-62 (1991). The conflict of course, surrounded the appropriate standard to apply
when a claimant alleged severe pain. Although the regulations appeared clear to the
Administration, federal courts continued to consider medically unsubstantiated pain testimony
in disability determination proceedings. Id. at 261.
158.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508 (1989) ("Your impairment must result from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. A physical or mental impairment must be
established by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only
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ation's policy does not permit a finding of disability based solely on the
claimant's subjective allegations of pain.' 59 Instead, the regulations and
internal policies limit consideration of subjective pain testimony to situations
in which claimants can show a medical condition reasonably capable of
producing their pain:
If you have a physical or mental impairment, you may have
symptoms (like pain, shortness of breath, weakness or nervousness). We consider all your symptoms, including pain, and the
extent to which signs and laboratory findings confirm these
symptoms. The effects of all symptoms, including severe and
prolonged pain, must be evaluated on the basis of a medically
determinable impairment which can be shown to be the cause of
the symptom. We will never find that you are disabled based on
your symptoms, including pain, unless medical signs or findings
show that there is a medical condition that could be reasonably
expected to produce those symptoms."w
In 1982, the Administration adopted an "in-house" ruling, Social Security
Ruling 82-58 (SSR 82-58), on the evaluation of pain and other symptoms.16 ' Similar to 20 C.F.R. section 404.1529, SSR 82-5862 instructed
Administration employees to credit only medically substantiated pain allegations. 10 SSR 82-58 states in part:
Symptoms such as pain, shortness of breath, weakness, or
nervousness are the individual's own perceptions of the effects of
a physical or mental impairment(s). Because of their subjective
characteristics and the absence of any reliable techniques for
measurement, symptoms (especially pain) are difficult to prove,
disprove, or quantify.... [This policy statement] emphasizes the

need for a sound medical basis to support the overall evaluation
of impairment severity and underscores the importance of detailed
by your statement of symptoms."); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528 (1989) defines symptoms as "[y]our
own description of your physical or mental impairment." The regulation goes on to state that
"[y]our statements alone are not enough to establish that there is a physical or mental
impairment."
159.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1528 (1989).
160.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1989).
161.
See SSR 82-58, supra note 152. Note the similarities between SSR 82-58 and 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1989).
162.
Although SSR 82-58 was superseded in 1988 by SSR 88-13, it is still relevant because
it provides background into the Administration's pain standard and was in effect at the time
Congress passed the Reform Act. For a discussion of SSR 88-13, see infra Section V.B.2. It
should be noted that Social Security Rulings are issued by the Secretary and represent binding
authority upon all components of the Administration, including ALJs. See 20 C.F.R. § 422.408
(1989).
163.
See Pryor, supra note 157, at 262.
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findings. .

.

. Symptoms will not have a significant effect on a

disability determination or decision unless medical signs or
findings show that a medical condition is present that could
reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms which are
alleged or reported. However, once such a medical condition
(e.g., disc disease) is objectively established, the symptoms are
still not controlling for purposes of evaluating disability. Clinical
and laboratory data and a well-documented medical history must
establish findings which may reasonably account for the symptom
in a particular impairment ....

There must be an objective basis

to support the overall evaluation of impairment severity. It is not
sufficent to
merely establish a diagnosis or a source for the
164
symptom.

SSR 82-58 was an important component of the Administration's overall pain
policy because it recognized the Administration's firm commitment to
requiring objective evidence: the evaluation team was required to reject a
claim for benefits if the alleged medical impairment was not reasonably likely
to produce the amount of pain alleged, despite complaints of severe and

debilitating pain."
Although the policy appeared clear enough, many federal courts continued
to find claimants' pain allegations credible, even in the absence of medical
evidence to support the claim in full." c Instead of following the Administration's policy, these courts created their own guidelines for handling
Thus, rather than resolving the earlier
subjective pain complaints."
conflict between the Administration and the federal judiciary as the
Administration had hoped, the revised regulations and new rulings only
exacerbated the problem.

SSR 82-58 (1982).
164.
Levy, supra note 12, at 493; see also Social Security Ruling 82-58 ("When a
165.
medically determinable severe impairment cannot be established on either a physical or a mental
basis, the claim must be denied, regardless of the intensity of the symptom, related limitations
alleged, or any judgments by examining medical sources about the effects of the symptom.").
Myers, 611 F.2d, at 983 (finding that the ALT should have considered the claimant's
166.
subjective pain allegations even though the claimant alleged greater intensity of the pain than was
objectively supported); Wiggins, 679 F.2d at 1390 (concluding that both the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuit precedent rejects the requirement that pain must be medically substantiated); Rivera, 717
is not
pain
finding
disability
so severe
as tothe
warrant
the of
F.2d at 724 (maintaining that pain by itself mayis befound,
fact athat
despite
where a medialy ascertained impainent
substantiated by objective medical findings). See also, Poskus, Analyzing and ProvingSubjective
Social Security Disability Purposes, 17 COO. LAW. 475 (1988) ("The federal courts
Pain
have For
disagreed with this [SSR 82-58] analysis, and reversals of [Social Security Administration]
decisions based on the agency improperly requiring objective evidence of pain have been
commonplace.").
167.
Budeit-Blondin, Pain-Can It Be a Pennanent Disability?, 57 CONN. B.J. 341, 342
(1983) ("For the most part, it has been left up to the courts to lay down the guidelines necessary
for the consideration of pain within a disability claim and as a separate disability itself.").
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B. Nonacquiescence
Although it is a broad concept affecting the disability process on a large
scale, the Administration's policy of nonacquiescence is a major force
contributing to the problem of subjective pain evaluation."e Nonacquiescence refers to "the administration's refusal to follow rules determined by the
Federal Courts to govern the disability determination process." " This
policy allows the Administration to ignore federal court decisions interpreting
a particular statute when the courts' and the Administration's interpretations
conflict."' ° This disregard for certain federal court decisions fosters discord
among the reviewing bodies and creates problems for all those involved in
disability determination proceedings where subjective pain is at issue because
it eliminates any hope for a uniform standard for evaluating pain.
IV. SECTION 3 OF THE REFORM ACT
Motivated by concern over the federal courts' apparent ignorance of the
Administration's policy on pain,'17' and the general conflict over the issue

168.
ProvingDisabling Pain,supra note 74, at 517 (noting that the Administration's policy
of nonacquiescence "has especially affected claimants who have alleged a disabling degree of
subjectively-felt pain").
169.
Fried, supra note 3.
170.
Note, Administrative Nonacquiescence in JudicialDecisions, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
147 (1984-85). The Administration, however, is bound by the decision as it relates to the
particular parties in the suit that created the conflicting ruling. The policy applies only to
subsequent proceedings.
The Administration justifies nonacquiescence by claiming that its policy promotes uniformity
in the disability determination process. See Levy, supra note 12, at 504. However, as long as
both the Administration and the federal courts are players within the process and as long as the
Administration insists on practicing this policy, uniformity will be virtually impossible because
although the Administration's program is nationally administered, circuit court decisions are
binding only within the particular circuit generating a ruling. For example, a claimant who is
denied benefits from the Administration will appeal to a federal court, and, if subjective pain
is in issue, the claimant will likely be awarded benefits. In this case, the Administration cannot
disregard the court's ruling. Another claimant, however, with similar facts and in the same
circuit will then initiate proceedings for benefits. This claimant will be denied benefits because
of the Administration's policy of nonacquiescence. Only if the claimant is both mentally and
financially stable enough to pursue an appeal will he be awarded benefits. See Note, supra note
170, at 152-58 (for a discussion on the possibility for equal protection challenges under such
circumstances).
171.
The Pain Commission reported that,
[d]uring the Congressional deliberations on Public Law (P.L.) 98-460 [specifically
Section 3] several Members noted the influence the federal courts were exercising
in defining various pain standards in the disability program. The decisions
regarding pain varied considerably from Circuit to Circuit, and primarily addressed
how a claimant's allegation of pain was to be assessed and evaluated in deciding
whether a claimant was under a disability. Some members were concerned that the
court opinions had gone beyond what the Congress had intended by giving too
much weight to allegations, thereby redefining the concept of disability. These
Members believed that the court pain standards were improper and beyond the
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of pain evaluation in disability determination proceedings,' 72 Congress
enacted Section 3. It was passed as an interim standard effective through
December 31, 1986.173 A sunset provision was included in the statute
because Congress intended to either amend or extend Section 3 before the
sunset date, depending on the results of a report from a commission
established to help Congress deal with the issue."
As noted earlier, Section 3 represented the first statutory standard for the
evaluation of pain. It was designed to end the confusion over pain testimony
in disability benefits cases by codifying the Administration's existing policy
on pain. 175 Section 3 states in part:
An individual's statements as to pain or other symptoms shall not
alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this
section; there must be medical signs and findings, established by
medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques,
which show the existence of a medical impairment that results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities
which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all evidence
required to be furnished under this paragraph (including statements of the individual or his physician as to the intensity and
persistence of such pain or other symptoms which may reasonably
be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and findings),
would lead to a conclusion that the individual is under a disability.
Objective medical evidence of pain or other symptoms established
by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory techniques (for
example, deteriorating nerve or muscle tissue) must be considered
in reaching176 a conclusion as to whether the individual is under a
disability.
In essence, the language mirrored the Administration's policy,"7 thus
reaffirming the requirement of objective medical evidence to substantiate pain
intent of Congress. Other Members were concerned that SSA (Administration) had
been too restrictive in its interpretation of how to evaluate pain, thereby wrongfully
denying benefits.
REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at xi. See also 1984 House Report, supra

note 18, at 3050. ("Almost every circuit court of appeals has ruled at some point over the last
ten years that eligibility should be based on subjective evidence of pain, at least in cases where
it [sic] corroborated by testimony of other witnesses.").
172.
See Pryor, supra note 157, at 263.
173.
1984 House Report, supra note 18, at 3086-87. See supra text accompanying notes
63-68.
174.
Id. at 3040-46.
175.
See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
176.
Reform Act, supra note 17.
177.
See supra text accompanying notes 160 and 164.
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allegations in full."

Not surprisingly, many federal courts have interpreted Section 3's language
to require medical evidence of a pain-producing impairment only, rather than
These
medical evidence supporting the full extent of the pain alleged.'
for
subjective
intended
that
Congress
arguing
by
their
actions
courts justify
pain testimony to play an important role in the disability determination
process.1s0
A. Legislative History
Section 3's legislative history, however, seems to reveal a contrary
intent."' The debate surrounding passage of Section 3, nevertheless,
provides insight into many of the courts' decisions. The arguments primarily
center on whether Congress should have adopted the Administration's current
standard for evaluating disability claimants' pain or a completely new
standard. Ultimately, the Administration's standard prevailed."
Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and William S. Cohen (R-ME) proposed the
Levin-Cohen amendment, legislation which would have included a statutory
definition of pain and required medical proof of the existence of pain but not
objective evidence of a medical condition causing the pain." The late

See Hand v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1545, 1548 (1lth Cir. 1985) ("Congress' purpose in
178.
implementing this standard was to codify the regulations and policies currently followed by the
Administration in order to promote national uniformity in the application of the social security
disability laws and insure that disability decisions are based on verifiable evidence.").
See id. See also Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984), amend. denied,
179.
804 F.2d 456 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 927 (1987); Cotton, 799 F.2d 1403; Luna v.
Bowen, 834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987); Avery, 797 F.2d at 21; Hyatt v. Heckler, 711 F. Supp.
837, 840 (W.D. N.C. 1989), aff'd in part, amended in part on other grds., vacated in part on
other grds., 899 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1990); Jenkins v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 107, 108 (4th Cir.
1990).
See Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407 (quoting Howard, 782 F.2d at 1488 n.4 ("Congress
180.
clearly meant that so long as the pain is associated with a clinically demonstrable impairment,
credible pain testimony should contribute to a determination of disability.")); Luna, 834 F.2d
at 163; Bunnell, 1991 WL 191634, at *4.
See Hand, 761 F.2d at 1548 n.3 ("The legislative history of Section 3 notes with
181.
concern that, despite the federal regulations, ALJs and federal courts have continued to give
heavy weight to subjective evidence of pain even without objective evidence of the type required
by regulation.").
Reports from both the House and Senate suggest Congress did not intend to create a
182.
new standard for determining disability based on pain. Instead, Congress was satisfied that
codification of existing policy would eliminate the confusion and disparity. "While it may be the
case that pain, in and of itself, regardless of its cause, can result in inability to work, there is
apparently still no way to verify the existence of such pain through objective medical testing.
The committee is therefore reluctant at this time to allow determinations of disability to be based
on such subjective criteria.... It is not appropriate for the Federal courts to establish policy
on such an issue simply because the statute is insufficiently specific." 1984 House Report, supra
note 17, at 3051. See generally S. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 3755, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1984).
129 CONG. REc. 2205 (1983) (statement of Sen. Cohen); 130 CONG. REC. 13219
183.
(1984) (statement of Sen. Cohen).
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Senator John Heinz (R-PA) also endorsed this proposal."u Heinz explained
his opposition to requiring objective evidence of pain and his opposition to
the Committee on Finance's bill as it pertained to Section 3:
In this bill, we limit the Secretary to only considering pain that
has a medically identifiable source of underlying impairment.
Objective medical evidence of pain in which an underlying cause
cannot be found is deemed irrelevant for the purposes of establishing disability. Subjective evidence of pain is also excluded. It
seems to me that this standard does not conform to the state of the
art in medical and scientific knowledge, and sets an overly narrow
and unrealistic standard. Pain is an extraordinarily complicated
medical phenomenon, and it is frequently the case that pain that
can be objectively identified cannot be linked to an underlying
impairment. To deny the existence of this phenomenon in this
program seems to be a serious mistake, one we will have to
correct in the future.185
On the other hand, Senator Russell B. Long (D-LA) strongly favored
enacting the Administration's existing policy on pain evaluation."' Senator
Long felt his proposal reflected Congress' intent to restrict the granting of
benefits to only those who established disability by objective medical
evidence. 1 Additionally, he believed it would ensure uniformity among
the adjudicating bodies and lead to more efficient administration and
review."' Although Senator Long and Senators Levin and Cohen had
differing perspectives on the role pain should play in disability determination
proceedings, Senator Long joined the others by expressing his distaste with
the fragmented standard currently being applied:
Courts do, of course, have the responsibility to carry out the law
and to resolve questions of interpretation. In so doing, however,
they should be guided by the statute and its legislative history, not
by abstract theories found in law review articles ....
But circuit
courts are not regional legislatures.... If the regional courts are
going to persist in ignoring the policy objectives expressed by
Congress and persist in refusing to grant appropriate deference to
the duly promulgated regulations of the Secretary, the Congress

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

130 CONG. REC. 13222 (1984) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
Id.
130 CONG. REC. 13214-17 (1984) (statement of Sen. Long).
Id. at 13215.
Id.
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may be forced to find ways of dealing with this situation."'

Senator Long's basic argument was that the taxpayers were not likely to
stand for a law which greatly expanded the existing program. Instead, he
argued that both taxpayers and claimants would best be served by a statute
which gave existing policy legislative credibility with the courts. He was
certain this could be accomplished by codifying the Administration's policy
on pain."° In the end, the Committee on Finance adopted Section 3 as it
was proposed by Senator Long. Senators Levin and Cohen, like Senator
Heinz, felt that the Administration's policy placed too heavy a burden on
"'
claimants and would assuredly need correcting in the future.19
The only House member to speak on Section 3 was House Representative
J.J. Pickle (D-TX):
With reference to pain, the conference agreement puts present
regulatory policy into statute until January 1, 1987, and mandates
that in the meantime, a study be conducted so that we might better
deal with this very difficult issue. I know that many Members in
both bodies are concerned about the fairness of our present
policies and I would expect that as we continue to benefit from the
progress of medical science, we will improve our laws in this
regard."9
The legislative history of Section 3 clearly indicates Congress' intent to
support and affirm the Administration's policy on pain. The primary
concern of both Houses was not to modify or change, but rather to add
clarity and consistency where they were greatly needed.re

189.
Id. at 13216. Senator Long's comments were aimed at a district court judge who
discarded the Secretary's rulings and regulations in favor of what the judge referred to as,
"Eighth Circuit Law," and held that a claimant's subjective pain complaints need not be fully
substantiated by objective medical proof. See Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 1004, 1008-09
(D. Minn.), aff'd 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), remanded on other grounds, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir.
1984), vacated, 476 U.S. 1167 (1986). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that disability
determinations dealing with pain were to be based on Section 3, SSR 82-58, and 20 C.F.R. §
404.529. Polaski, 751 F.2d at 950.
190.
130 CONG. REC. at 13215, 13216, 13238, 13239 (1984).

191.

Id. at 13219, 13237-38. See also id. at 13226. (The committee amendment reads in

part: "... . eligibility for benefits may not be based solely on subjective allegations of pain (or

other symptoms). There must be evidence of an underlying medical condition and (1) there must
be objective medical evidence to conform the severity of the alleged pain arising from that
condition or (2) the objectively determined medical condition must be of a severity which can

reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain."). See generally S.476, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984).
192.
130 CONG. REC. at 26142 (1984) (statement of Rep. Pickle).
193.

Depending on whether the Secretary, an AiU, or a federal court heard a claimant's

case, the claimant might or might not have been awarded benefits based on disability. This
fragmented application of existing policy caused congressional concern. See 1984 House Report,
supra note 18, at 3051.
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B. Objectives
Realizing the complex nature of pain evaluation, Congress included in
Section 3 a requirement that the Secretary appoint a National Commission on
the Evaluation of Pain (Commission)." Both Houses agreed on the need
for the Commission and its assistance in clarifying the proper standard for
pain evaluation.195 The Commission, working closely with the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences (Institute), was to conduct a
study on pain,' z assess its impact on disability determination proceedings,
and report to Congress on its findings before December 31, 1986.17
The Commission was appointed on April 1, 1985"a and consisted of 20
members, all of whom were chosen on the basis of their knowledge of pain
and related issues." Although the Commission forwarded its findings to
the Secretary before the sunset date, it did not accomplish the objectives
within the time-frame Congress had allotted.' The Commission's overall
opinion was that Section 3's language should not be changed or modified at
that time because the extremely complex nature of the issue called for more
extensive evaluation."' The Commission's report ultimately sent a message
to the Secretary and Congress calling for a resolution of this "legal-medical
issue; " however, it did little to inspire new legislation. The essence of
the message sent was that difficult issues and sparse data precluded the

194.
See Reform Act, supra note 17, at 1799.
195.
See generally S. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 3755, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984); see also 130 CONG. REC. at 13235 (1984) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
This legislation contains an important proposal requiring the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to appoint a commission of experts to conduct a study
concerning the evaluation of pain in determining eligibility for disability benefits.
Quite often, an individual may suffer from excruciating, debilitating pain that is
impossible to measure objectively. As yet, the SSA has no guidelines for the
evaluation of subjective evidence of pain, in determining disability. It is my hope
that, upon review of the commission's report, we can decide whether such
guidelines are feasible.
196.
This was mandated by the Reform Act. See Reform Act, supra note 17, at § 3(b).
197.
Id.
198.
REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at xi.
199.
The expertise of the Commission's members included medicine, law, insurance, and
disability program administration. See id. at xli.
200.
Congress had expected the Commission to perform the following tasks prior to
December 31, 1986: "(1) complete its mandated study of the issues; (2) evaluate the appropriateness of the standard [Section 3]; and (3) recommend extension, modification, or termination of
the statutory language." Report, supra note 2, at 27. The first task could not be completed
because of the complex nature of the issues coupled with the time constraint. The Commission,
however, felt the issues were important enough to require further consideration. Id.
201.
REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at xii, 74. See infra text
accompanying note 204.
202.
Ruppert, Developments in Social Secuity Law, 22 IND. L. REv. 401, 405 (1988).
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Commission from recommending additional legislation at that time.'
Commission's overall recommendation reads:

The

The current statutory standard for the evaluation of pain should be
extended without modification for the duration of the experiment(s) being recommended by this Commission and for one year

thereafter. Any modification in the statutory language should only
be made after additional data are acquired as a result of the study
being conducted by the Institute of Medicine of the National
Academy of Sciences and through the experimental process.?
In its report, the Commission recognized two broad categories of pain:
acute and chronic. The Commission noted that chronic pain is often more
difficult to recognize because of the frequent absence of an objectively
identifiable underlying medical condition? 5 As the report makes clear, the
Commission was deeply concerned over pain for which there was no
In fact, the Commission considered
objectively identifiable source.'
recommending to the Administration that it include a special category on pain
impairment within the Listing; 7 however, Commission members failed to
reach a consensus on this issue? 8 While a minority of the members
dissented by drafting a proposed category for the Listing,' the majority
REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at xv.
203.
Id. at xxiv. Specifically, the Commission recommended to the Administration that it
204.
reassess its policies and procedures and make the necessary changes to insure that pain receives
adequate consideration in the disability determination process. See id. at xiv-v. This
recommendation, however, was merely superficial and neglected to suggest the fundamental
changes necessary to insure that subjective pain testimony would not be disregarded solely on
the basis that the complaints were not medically substantiated in full.
See id. at 54-55. Usually, acute pain is the effect of a recent injury or illness and
205.
ordinarily subsides as the medical condition improves, typically within one month. Chronic
pain, on the other hand, often has no identifiable medical source which could be expected to
produce the pain alleged. It is longer in duration than acute pain, often lasting as long as six
months or more.
The Commission devoted a substantial portion of its report to discussing what it refers to
as chronic pain syndrome (CPS). Individuals suffering from CPS experience a great deal of pain
all of the time; pain is a factor of daily living. They develop negative behaviors to deal with
their pain such as drug use, and often seek extensive, and sometimes drastic, medical solutions.
However, nothing works because there is no evidence of an underlying condition causing the
pain. So, the pain continues, and the sufferers find no relief in either drugs, medical
procedures, or through disability insurance benefits. Id. The Commission emphasizes the fact
that CPS sufferers do not simply imagine their painalthough they may experience psychological
setbacks as a result. (CPS, as opposed to ordinary chronic pain, has severe sociological and
psychological characteristics.) CPS is real; however, at this time it is almost impossible to fully
medically substantiate. Id. at 56-57.
See id. at xv. Ordinary chronic pain, like CPS, is extremely difficult to medically
206.
substantiate.
See supra text accompanying notes 107-10. Currently, the Listing only recognizes
207.
some forms of acute pain. See REPORT ON THE EVALUAT ON OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 54.
20&,
See id.
REPORT 0N THE EVALUATIQN OF PAIN, supra note 2, at 125-27. Of the twenty-one
20,
Coinimission membis four dissente& Id.
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concluded that such a proposal was premature given the lack of data, and
instead, called for an experiment or set of experiments to determine the
sociological and economical feasibility of a special category for pain
impairment. 2 ° The minority, on the other hand, insisted the experiment
was overly cautious and urged immediate substantive action.
The
majority view prevailed, and the experiment
became
part
of
the
Commi212
ssion's broad recommendation to Congress.
As noted above, the Commission's overall recommendation called for an
additional study by the Institute. This study began where the Commission's
report ended, utilizing much of the data collected by the Commission through
experimentation.1 3 In line with the Commission's report, the Institute's
study primarily concerned chronic pain, and whether it could be adequately
assessed for disability purposes. 2t4 The study concluded that it could be
assessed properly by evaluating how a claimant's pain affects his or her
ability to function.1 5 The Institute recommended a change in the current
sequential evaluation process which called for this type of a functional
assessment before a pain claimant's claim for benefits could be rejected. 1 6
V.- RECOMMENDATIONS
It has been over four years since the sun set on Section 3. Congress had
intended to amend the legislation before it expired; 217 its failure to do so
has wreaked havoc on the entire disability determination process. The Ninth
Circuit conflict previously discussed is a prime example of how federal
courts, in the absence of legislative guidance, have employed various

210.
See id. at xv-vi. The "reactivation/vocational rehabilitation experiment" consisted of
two phases: Phase I called for a basic paper study of disability rolls to identify whether,
demographically, there was a need for a special category on pain impairment; Phase II, relying
on the criteria established by Phase I, was to predict whether the identified group would benefit
from a special category. See id. at 104-116 for an outline of the proposed experiment.
211.
Id. at 121.
212.
See id. at 104-16.
213.
See INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 263.

214.
215.

See id. at 2.
Id.at 268.

216.
Id. ("[The kinds of acceptable evaluation and corroboration should not be limited to
medical evidence of an underlying disease process. With or without such findings, consideration
should also be given to serious functional limitations and serious problems on measures of
integrated behavior."). The Institute ultimately made six recommendations; for purposes of this
Comment, the third is most significant. See infra text accompanying notes 224-37 for a
discussion of the practical application of such a functional assessment procedure.
217.
See 1984 House Report, supra note 18, at 3046 ("With respect to the area that is not
so clarified, i.e., the use of subjective evidence of pain in disability determinations, the intent
of Congress is clear: upon receipt of information adequate to form a reasonable basis for
legislating, Congress will enact a specific policy concerning pain; until that time, no change in
policy by the Social Security Administration is mandated by this bill.").

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol28/iss1/12

30

1991]

SUBECnVE PAIN TESTIMONY IN DISABILITY DETERMINATION PROCEEDINGS

203

Rodgers: Subjective Pain Testimony in Disability Determination Proceedings

measures for handling subjective pain testimony."' The Administration
has responded to the lack of legislative direction by passing an "in-house"
ruling to supersede former SSR 82-58."9 Although the Administration's
measure may be helpful to individual Administration employees, it does little
to promote uniformity, one of Congress' primary concerns in passing the
Reform Act.'
In the final analysis, it appears the core of the problem is centered on the
issue of whether a claimant should be required to substantiate, by objective
medical evidence, the full extent of his or her alleged disability. Indeed, the
elusive relationship between a medically documented impairment and the
degree of pain alleged has sparked great concern." It is submitted that
much of the problem with subjective pain allegations in disability determination proceedings could be eliminated by a concerted effort on the part of both
Congress and the Administration to define the role of pain in disability
determination proceedings explicitly setting forth the weight to be afforded
to subjective pain testimony. Congress, in accordance with action taken by
the Administration, should amend the Social Security Act to include
consideration of the effect a claimant's pain may have on his or her ability
to function in both the home and work environment.? Similarly, the
Administration should add a special category on pain impairment to the
current sequential evaluation process which would allow the evaluation team
to make a functional assessment when confronted with an excess pain claim.
The following discussion will explain the practical application of such a
proposition, as well as offer support for the argument.

218.
See generally Bunnell, 912 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1990) (relying on the Secretary's
regulations); vacated, Bunnell, 1991 WL 191634; Luna, 834 F.2d 161 (relying on prior judicial
interpretations of Section 3); Hollis, 837 F.2d 1378 (relying on circuit precedent).
219.
Social Security Ruling 88-13 (1988) [hereinafter SSR 88-131. This ruling basically
reiterates the policy statement contained in SSR 82-58; however, SSR 88-13 clarifies the
Administration's apparent willingness to consider pain at each stage of the sequential evaluation
process once an impairment is medically documented. In other words, a claimant's subjective
pain testimony will be considered in determining the severity of the impairment but not the
existence of the impairment.
220.
130 CONG. REc. 13206 (1984).
221.
See Luna, 834 F.2d at 163-64 ("The issue is clearly one of degree."). INST. OF MED.,
supra note 1, at 8 ("There is an imperfect correspondence between severity of pain and
dysfunction. People can have severe pain with minimal functional limitations or minimal pain
with severe limitations.").
222.
The current regulations require medical evidence of a severe physical or mental
impairment. If none exists, the claimant is automatically denied benefits. The evaluation team
does not conduct further study into a claimant's functional capacity. See supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
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A. The Proposal2'
This proposal provides for a pain-oriented assessment early in the
sequential evaluation process. This early assessment will preclude the
evaluation team from rejecting pain claimants' claim for benefits before
considering the impact of the pain on the claimants' ability to function.
1. CongressionalAction. As noted, Section 3's language is inappropriate
because it requires claimants to provide medical proof of a condition which
could reasonably produce the full extent of their alleged pain.' In many
instances, this is simply not possible.' Therefore, Congress should
eliminate this requirement in favor of permitting "excess pain" claimants to
prove disability by establishing dysfunction based on their pain. Such
legislation could modify Section 3 and should prompt the Administration to
take concurrent measures. Based on the dissenting Commission members'
proposal and the Institute's recommendations, the statute should read:
An individual's statements as to pain or other symptoms shall not
alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this
section; there must be medical signs and findings, established by
medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques,
which show the existence of a medical impairment that results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities
which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged. When medical evidence ispresent which could
reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged, the individualwill be considered disabled. If, however,
medical documentation fails to support the full extent of the
allegedpain, an individual may establish a medical impairment
either by showing objective evidence of physical damage such as
tissue damageor bone deteriorationor by allegingpaindisproportionate in intensity, location, or durationto the physical damage,
and by manifesting through behavior a preoccupationwith pain,
an overutilizationof the healthcaresystem, excessive reliance on
pain medication, audiblesigns and body language consistent with
the degree of pain alleged, and/or other objectively observable
behaviors such as sleeping or eating disorders and sexual
dysfunction. Once the individualestablishesa medical impairment
through one of the procedures outlined above, a functional
223. This proposal is largely based on the dissenting Commission members' proposal and the
Institute's third recommendation. See REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2, at
125-27; INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 268-70.
224.
See supra text accompanying note 105.
225.
See supra text accompanying note 4. See also infra note 231 and accompanying text.
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assessment will be conducted for the purpose of determining
whether such pain is in fact disabling. This assessment involves
the considerationof all evidence relevant to such a determination
including, but not limited to, statements of the individual or his
physician as to the intensity andpersistence of such pain or other
symptoms, and statements of the individual'sfamily, friends, or
coworkers indicatingdysfunction due to pain in one or more of the
following areas: activities of daily living; social functioning;
ability to complete tasks; functional capacity to perform basic
work activities. The assessment broadly includes a consideration
of the individual'sinability to feed or dress him or herself, to sit
or pay attentionfor extended periods of time, and/or a persistent
inabilityto effectively interact and communicate with others on a
personallevel.'
This language effectively eliminates the unfairness which currently exists in
Congress' approach to pain.
2. AdministrativeAction. To complement this proposed legislative action,
changes must also be made in the Administration's handling of subjective
pain testimony. As noted, the current sequential evaluation process'
establishes a procedure for determining disability based on a "question and
Under this process, a claimant who alleges
answer-type" process.'
objective support for the pain is denied
documented,
no
with
pain
debilitating
satisfied step two, the existence of a
not
has
he
because
benefits
disability
9 As previously submitted, the
impairment.'
mental
or
severe physical
process requires the claimant to produce objective medical evidence of the
full extent of his pain,'D a virtually impossible requirement. 3 Thus, the
Administration's as well as the Congress' need to require the existence of a
relationship between an impairment and the full degree of pain alleged
2
imposes an unrealistic and unjust burden on many pain claimants3 The
following proposal suggests an alternative to the Administration's current
The nonitalicized portions of the proposed statute are taken directly from the language
226.
of Section 3. The italicized portions, on the other hand, are drawn almost exclusively from the
dissenting Commission members' proposal. See REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra
note 2, at 125-27.
See supra note 94.
227.
See supra note 95.
228.
In this type of situation, the evaluation ends at step two. See supra notes 105-06 and
229.
accompanying text. See also supra text accompanying note 105.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1989) requiring medical evidence of a "medical condition
230.
that could reasonably be expected to produce [the claimant's] symptoms."
INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 3 ("There is no, direct objective way to measure
231.
pain.").
Id. at 2 ("Much research and clinical experience with pain have demonstrated that
232.
there is no clear relation between the amount of tissue damage and the degree of discomfort or

functional disability.").
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policy on pain and proposes an additional listing to the current sequential
evaluation process.
Under this proposal, a claimant is required to first objectively establish the
existence of a physical or mental impairment which could reasonably be
expected to produce "some" amount of pain. 33 A claimant could satisfy
this requirement by showing either physical evidence specifically related to
the alleged pain such as tissue damage or bone deterioration. Alternatively,
the claimant could allege pain which is disproportionate to or uncharacteristic
of the physical evidence shown. After satisfying either requirement, the
claimant must then show behavioral manifestations ordinarily thought to be
associated with severe or prolonged pain: a preoccupation with his pain
apparent through repeated complaints; a desire and willingness to undergo
painful procedures as a way of alleviating the pain; overutilization of the
healthcare system in search of a cure; overreliance on or excessive use of
pain medication; audible signs or body language consistent with his complaints such as moaning, limping, bracing himself, grimacing, etc.; and/or
other pain-related behaviors which are objectively identifiable such as sleep
or eating disorders or sexual dysfunction.
Once the claimant establishes that he suffers from a pain-producing
impairment, a functional assessment of the claimant's pain is triggered.'
This assessment requires the evaluation team to specifically assess the
claimant's ability to respond to stimuli present in four categories essential to
work productivity: 1) activities of daily living, 2) social functioning, 3)
ability to complete tasks, and 4) functional capacity to perform basic work
activities. 5 The burden is on claimants to provide the evaluation team
with information relevant to this assessment. Such information can come in
the form of statements by family, friends, co-workers, employers, and by the
claimants themselves.
1) Activities of Daily Living. The first category requires consideration of
the claimant's ability to effectively deal with life's everyday demands. These
demands include ordinary activities such as maintaining personal hygiene,
233.
This proposal in no way suggests that benefits should be awarded on the basis of
subjective complaints alone. The objection arises from the requirement that claimants produce
medical evidence supporting the full extent of their pain before assessing basic functional ability.
234.
This step is the equivalent of step four of the current sequential evaluation process.
Procedurally, steps four and five would remain unchanged; the claimant would still carry the
burden of proving his inability to perform his past work, and the Secretary would still be
required to show that there was other work available to the claimant. Basically, the only change
made by the proposal is that the evaluation team could no longer reject a claim on the basis of
a lack of medical evidence before considering the claimants functional limitations. This is
currently what happens at step two when a claimant alleges severe pain with no medically
identifiable source. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
235.
In conducting this assessment it is important for the evaluation team to obtain any and
all evidence available from the claimant's family, friends, coworkers, etc ....
which tends to
corroborate the claimant's subjective pain complaints and/or his or her inability to cope in one
of the four categories. Along these same lines, the ALT should permit the same type of
testimony during the claimant's hearing.
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dressing and feeding oneself, as well as other demanding but necessary
activities such as paying bills, taking public transportation, visiting the post

office, or using the telephone.'
2) Social Functioning. The listing's second category requires the
evaluation team to assess the claimant's communication and interaction skills
in order to determine the claimant's ability to function in a social setting.
Assessment of these skills focuses on the claimant's ability to get along with
not only his family and friends, but also his landlord, his physician, the
grocery store clerk, and the bus driver. For example, persistent social
isolation or a history of fighting may demonstrate impaired social functioning
due to pain. On the other hand, a desire and willingness to interact with
others through participation in group activities likely indicates healthy social
skills.
3) Ability to Complete Tasks. The third category focuses on the claimant's
ability to undertake and complete self-initiated or assigned tasks in a timely
manner. Here, the evaluation team is concerned with such work-related
skills as concentration, persistence, and pace. These skills may be properly
measured by assessing the length of time it takes the claimant to complete a
work-related task or perform a routine household chore.
4) FunctionalCapacity to PerformBasic Work Activities. The fourth and
final category requires consideration of basic work activities. It is important
for the evaluation team to consider such exertional activities as sitting,

standing, walking, lifting, pulling, pushing, and carrying as well as those
nonexertional requirements demanded by the work-place such as the ability
to concentrate, follow directions, report in a timely manner, and get along
with both superiors and coworkers.
B. Support
Not only is this proposal supported by the Commission's dissenting
members' proposal and the Institute's study, but also it finds support in case
law, and surprisingly enough, in the Administration's own regulations and
rulings. Although supportive, the current caselaw and administrative
regulations and rulings do not go far enough to remedy the existing problem.

The activities listed in this category, as well as in the other three, are not meant to be
236.
put through a balancing test for the purpose of determining the exact number of activities which
are restricted; rather, they are to be separated individually to determine the degree of restriction
present within each activity. For example, a claimant may be perfectly capable of feeding and
caring for him or herself, however, his or her inability to sit or stand or to pay attention for
prolonged periods may indicate disabling pain. This is what the dissenters refer to in their
proposal as 'marked" restriction. See REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 2,

at 125-27.
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1. Caselaw. As noted, the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Bunnell
reaffirmed the earlier pain standard enunciated in Cotton. 7 This standard,
which precludes an AI. from discrediting subjective pain testimony solely
because such testimony is not fully supported by objective medical evidence,
is characteristic of many circuit court decisions in this area."
For example, the Tenth Circuit, in Luna v. Bowen,239 drew attention to
the issue of subjective pain testimony by addressing the relationship between
the medical impairment and the degree of pain alleged.'
The court
explained that by allowing the AL to rely primarily on objective medical
evidence to determine whether the claimant's impairment is "reasonably"
likely to cause his or her pain, courts place too heavy a burden on claimants
to establish a sufficiently tight nexus between the impairment and the severity
of the pain alleged." Relying on Cotton, the court concluded that after
demonstrating the existence of a medical impairment through objective
evidence, the claimant is only required to establish a loose relationship
between the impairment and his or her pain. 2
Although facially helpful to claimants, 243 the pain standards articulated
in Bunnell, Luna, and other decisions" are, by themselves, insufficient to
237.
See supra note 69.
238.
See Polaski, 751 F.2d 943; Luna, 834 F.2d 161; Elam, 921 F.2d 1210.
239.
834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987).
240.
Luna, 834 F.2d at 163. Under both Section 3 and the Administration's regulations,
the impairment must be one which could "reasonably" be expected to cause the claimant's pain.
See supra note 22; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1989).
241.
Luna, 834 F.2d at 164.
242.
Id. The court explained that,
[u]nder this standard, a claimant certainly must demonstrate more than apotentially
pain-causing impairment before the decision maker must weigh all other evidence.
. .. The more difficult issue is how tight a relation the statute requires between
the impairment and the allegation. Sufficient evidence of congressional intent
exists to convince us that the statute requires only a loose nexus between the
proven impairment and the pain alleged. Accordingly, if an impairment is
reasonably expected to produce some pain, allegations of disabling pain emanating
from that impairment are sufficiently consistent to require consideration of all
relevant evidence.
Id.
243.
The decisions themselves are merely facially helpful because the remedy afforded by
these courts is available only after the claimant labors through the entire administrative process
first. See supra note 32.
244.
In Polaski, the court articulated the following standard:
While the claimant has the burden of proving that the disability results from a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment, direct medical evidence of the cause and
effect relationship between the impairment and the degree of the claimant's subjective
complaints need not be produced. The adjudication may not disregard a claimant's
subjective complaints solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support
them.
Polaski, 751 F.2d at 948 . Other courts have expressed similar standards. See Jenkins, 906
F.2d at 108 ("A claimant [is required] to show objective medical evidence of some condition that
could reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged, not objective evidence of the pain
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correct the unfairness which currently exists within the disability determination process and are inconsistent with congressional intent.'
These
opinions do, however, illustrate both the strong desire and willingness of the
federal courts to recognize subjective pain testimony and their recent
commitment to doing so. It is now up to Congress and the Administration
to provide the courts with the means to effectuate this end.

2.

Administrative Regulations and Rulings. Additionally, the proposal is

supported by the Administration's current approach to the evaluation of
mental impairments.'
When evaluating a mental impairment as a basis
for disability, the Administration's regulations require the evaluation team to
conduct a functional assessment of the alleged impairment.' 7 SSR 88-13
also lends support to the proposal:m
In determining whether an impairment(s) is severe, full consideration is to be given to all material evidence, including signs,
symptoms (such as pain), and laboratory findings. Objective
findings may confirm that the individual has a severe impairment.
If they do not, the degree of pain must be considered ...

[W]here the degree of pain alleged is significantly greater than
that which can be reasonably anticipated based on the objective
physical findings, the adjudicator must carefully explore any
additional limitation(s) imposed by the pain on the individual's
functional ability beyond those limitations indicated by the
itself."); Hyatt, 711 F. Supp. at 846 ("The absence of objective medical evidence of the pain
itself, its intensity or degree, is not grounds for concluding that the pain is either inconsistent
with or not reasonably related to the underlying impairment."). In Hyatt, the court went so far
as to rescind the Administration's rulings and implement its own ruling for use in North
Carolina: "... . the Secretary must abandon, and does hereby abandon for North Carolina, the
pain evaluation policy previously applied by his decision-makers." Hyatt, 711 F. Supp. at 845.
The policy mandated by the court stated, in part:
Once an underlying physical or mental impairment that could reasonably be
expected to cause pain is shown by medically acceptable objective evidence, such
as clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, the adjudicator must evaluate the
disabling effects of a claimant's pain, even though its intensity or severity is shown
only by subjective evidence.
Id.
245.
See supra notes 57 and 72 and accompanying text. See also Hyatt, 711 F.Supp at 843
(maintaining that Section 3 "does not provide any directions concerning the evaluation of
subjective evidence of the degree or intensity of pain, should objective medical evidence of the
degree or intensity of the pain not be available.") However, of course, both the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits claim their pain standard is fully consistent with both congressional and
administrative intent. See Bunnell, 1991 WL 191634, at *6; Elam, 921 F.2d at 1214-15.
246.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (1989).
247.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)(3) (1989).
248.
The SSR is not completely supportive because it still contains the initial requirement
of objective medical evidence of an impairment which could possibly produce the degree of pain
alleged.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991

37

210

[Vol.
REVIEW
WESTERN
CALIFORNIA
California Western
LawLAW
Review,
Vol. 28 [1991], No. 1, Art.
12

28

objective medical evidence before any conclusions about severity
can be reached." 9
SSR 88-13 provides further that:
There are situations in which an individual's alleged or reported
symptoms, such as pain, suggest the possibility of a greater restriction
of the individual's ability to function than can be demonstrated by
objective medical evidence alone. In such cases, reasonable conclusions
as to any limitations on the individual's ability to do basic work
activities can be derived from the consideration of other information in
conjunction with medical evidence. This is consistent with court
decisions which require that statements of the claimant or his/her
physician as to the intensity and persistence of pain or other symptoms
which may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs
and laboratory findings are to be included in the evidence to be
considered in making a disability determination.'
This concern over functional limitation is precisely the idea the proposal
is premised upon; therefore, it appears that the Administration at least
recognizes that functional assessment is an important component of any
disability determination proceeding. The Administration's actions to date,
however, do nothing to remedy the problem. The regulations, as well as the
SSRs, should provide for functional assessment early in the sequential
evaluation process, as early as the claimant's first complaint of severe or
prolonged pain. 51
CONCLUSION

It seems ironic that two of Congress' greatest concerns in enacting the
Reform Act, uniformity and fairness,' 2 continue to haunt all those involved in the disability determination process. Congress' attempt to placate
those concerned over subjective pain testimony by including Section 3 in the
statute accomplished little. It is no surprise, therefore, that federal courts.
unskilled in the complexities surrounding claimants' subjective complaints of
pain, loosely interpreted Section 3 by requiring only a relaxed nexus between
an underlying medical condition and the degree of pain alleged. This type
of pain policy is in line with the purpose for which the Social Security Act
was enacted and should be adopted by Congress in place of the Administra249.
SSR 88-13.
250.
Id.
251.
See INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 9 ("The committee's recommendation is that a
primary complaint of pain allow an early assessment of the claimant's functional capacity for
work.").
See 1984 House Report, supra note 18, at 3039.
252.
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tion's present policy.2?3
There is no way of knowing the exact number of claimants who have been
wrongly denied benefits because of the overly harsh pain policy currently in
place. z' However, continuing to require claimants to provide medically
documented proof of the degree of their pain will most assuredly result in
many more legitimately disabled claimants being denied the benefits they
deserve. 5 Congress should pass legislation which adopts Cotton and Luna
and which is modeled after the Commission's dissenting members' proposal
and the Institute's recommendation. New legislation and administrative
regulations should (1) eliminate the need for a "reasonable" nexus between
the medically substantiated impairment and the degree of pain alleged and (2)
include a functional pain-assessment category in the Listing. This will go a
long way toward remedying many of the existing problems in the Social
Security disability determination process. Without such change, however,
problems like those in the Ninth Circuit will continue to plague the overall
process. In the long run, claimants will suffer most.
Margaret C. Rodgers*

253.

Keefv. Weinberger, 404 F. Supp. 1193, 1195-6 (D. Kan. 1975) ("The purpose of the

Social Security Act is to ameliorate some of the rigors of life for those who are disabled or

impoverished. To accomplish this goal, the Act must be construed liberally."). See also
Goldhammer & Bloom, supra note 3 ("The Social Security Administration's rules and
regulations then operate to exclude classes of disability applicants, out-of-keeping with the
purpose of the Social Security Act."); Fair,885 F.2d at 603 ("The Social Security Act does not
require that claimants be utterly incapacitated to be eligible for benefits.").

254.

Id. (finding the Administration responsible for exercising "callous disregard" for those

persons functionally incapacitated because of pain).

255.

Bunnell, 912 F.2d at 1158 (dissent).

* This comment is dedicated with love to the memory of my grandmother, Kay Van Riper.
Her enthusiasm for the law will continue to inspire me always. Special thanks to Victor
Cosentino for his hard work and sound guidance during the editing process.
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